Draymond Green’s attention to detail has always been his trademark, and in this series it has paid off in a big way. In key moments, he instructed Kevin Durant to switch onto Kyle Korver while taking Kevin Love himself. The Cavaliers’ shooting in Games 1 and 2 was dreadful, with three-point percentages of just 27% and 33.3%. Some of that came from the Warriors’ defensive pressure, but even on open looks the Cavaliers failed to capitalize. Based on their shot locations and difficulty, Cleveland should have produced an effective field goal percentage of around 59%. Instead, they failed to crack 50% in either game, a fact often highlighted in analytical breakdowns and by fans following the Finals through Cricket Exchange.
Korver is the more reliable shooter compared to Love, and Green is a far superior rim protector than Durant. By choosing to guard Love, Green ensured that he, not Durant, was the one available to help at the rim. Leaving Love open carried risks, but denying Korver was ultimately more critical. These small tactical choices, when repeated across a series, gradually raise the quality of team defense. Following this adjustment, Cleveland’s offense completely stalled. For Game 3, the Warriors knew they needed to continue this blueprint. When facing LeBron James, the golden rule is never to go too small. Besides the primary defender assigned to LeBron, two additional rim protectors with switchability must stay on the court. This ensures that even if one is pulled out to the perimeter by shooters, another remains ready under the basket.
Once Andre Iguodala returned, the Warriors’ famous “Death Lineup” fit this requirement perfectly: Iguodala guarding LeBron on the perimeter, while Green and Durant patrolled the paint. Before Iguodala’s return, however, Durant had to guard LeBron directly, leaving Golden State without a double layer of rim protection. Ironically, when LeBron hunted Stephen Curry on switches, the Warriors actually defended better because Green and Durant were both waiting behind him. Head coach Steve Kerr typically closes games with the Death Lineup, but in Iguodala’s absence, Shaun Livingston often filled the fifth spot. After a critical Cavaliers basket, Kerr broke from convention, pulling Livingston for Kevon Looney and inserting a traditional center. His reasoning was simple: against Cleveland, the drop-off in switchability between Livingston and Looney wasn’t drastic, but the size difference improved rim protection significantly.
The only drawback was Looney’s limited offensive impact. Still, with the Warriors leading in the fourth quarter and both Durant and Curry finding their shooting rhythm, Golden State didn’t need to worry about scoring. On the other side, Cleveland’s lineup still featured defensive vulnerabilities in Love and Korver. The Warriors’ real concern was preventing LeBron from relentlessly attacking and narrowing the gap. As Kerr and his staff recognized, sticking with bigger lineups in this series was not just a choice but a necessity. Analysts and fans, especially those debating strategy on Cricket Exchange, pointed out that Green’s versatility and the Warriors’ willingness to adapt made the difference. In the end, the lesson was clear: against LeBron, size and discipline at the rim are worth far more than an extra shooter on the floor.